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NOTE

BEATING THE GRIM REAPER, OR JUST
CONFUSING HIM? EXAMINING THE
HARMFUL EFFECTS OF VIATICAL
SETTLEMENT REGULATION
INTRODUCTION

John Smith, a twenty-five year old New York man,1 is dying of
AIDS. 2 His doctors tell him he has less than two years to live. 3 He
cannot afford to pay his enormous hospital bills. He cannot afford
to make his house or car payments. He desperately wants to travel
around the world before he dies. 4 John Smith needs cash, and he
needs it quickly. Although his resources are limited, John finds
what seems to be the perfect solution. Under New York's Viatical
Settlement Act, 5 John can get the money he needs by selling his life
1. The demonstrative plight of John Smith is fictitious. John Smith's profile fits that of the age group most at risk for contracting AIDS. See Arnold H.
Grossman, The Faces of HIVIAIDS, PARKS & RECREATION, Mar. 1993, at 44
(stating that the number of AIDS cases rises dramatically among those 20 to 24
years of age, i.e., 9,270 cases and in those 25 to 29 years of age, i.e., 37,206
cases); see also Office of the Director, Centers for Disease Control & Prevention
Business Responds to AIDS Program 1992-1993, 269 JAMA 1370 (1993) (stating that "[o]f all acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) cases reported
through 1991 in the United States, 76% occurred among persons aged 25-44
years").
2. An individual can be HIV positive, meaning he has the AIDS-causing
virus, without necessarily contracting the disease. See Cornelis A. Rietmeijer,
Cost of Care for Patients With Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection: Patterns of Utilization and Charges in a Public Health Care System, 269 JAMA
2476 (1993) (noting studies that trace health care costs of HIV patients who
have had the disease for 13 years or more). Individuals who have not yet developed the disease incur a large part of HIV-related medical costs. Id.
3. Most people who currently viaticate their policies have less than two
years left to live. Dottie Enrico, Regulators Halt Death Investment: North Dakota Orders End to AIDS Scheme, NEWSDAY, Aug. 20, 1992, at 53.
4. People who sell their life insurance policies at a discount rate can use
the sale proceeds for anything they wish, "including the realization of lifelong
and unaffordable dreams." Kara Swisher, Allstate to Offer Discounts to Buy
Policies of the Terminally Ill, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1991, at B8.
5. See N.Y. INS. LAw §§ 7801-7810 (McKinney 1993) (allowing viatical settlement companies to pay compensation in return for policy owner's assignment). The word "viatical" means "to provide for a journey." Viatication, a New
FinancialTool for PWAs, AIDS POLICY & LAw, Oct. 16, 1991, at 4 [hereinafter
AIDS POLICY & LAw]. Richard W. Bandfield was the first person to apply viatication to third-party payment in contrast to insurance companies. Id. Some
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insurance policy6 for part of the policy's value in cash. 7
A viatical settlement requires that John make the purchaser of
his life insurance policy the beneficiary under the policy. 8 The purchaser pays an agreed upon price for the policy, takes over John's
premium payments, and receives John's death benefits when he
dies. 9 The less time John has left to live, the more money he is
likely to receive for his policy.' 0 John is now a viator. That is, he
has sold his life insurance policy to continue his life's journey.
John Smith's perfect solution, however, is laden with difficulties. The viatical settlement market has recently become subject to
stringent state regulation. Specifically, New York's Viatical Settlement Act limits those who may wish to purchase a viator's life in12
surance policy" and restricts the rate at which it may be sold.
Thus, the Act actually makes it more difficult for John to sell his
policy to whom he wants for the price he wants.
This Note examines the stifling consequences of recent legislation regulating the viatical settlement market. Part I discusses the
development of the viatical settlement market in response to the
financial problems faced by people with AIDS. Part II examines the
purposes and goals behind current viatical settlement statutes.
insurance companies allow their policy holders to collect when the policy
holder's life expectancy is one year or less. Id.
6. Life insurance is a contract in which an individual, the insured, agrees

to pay another, the insurer, a certain sum, called a premium, in return for the
insurer's agreement to pay another sum upon the death of the individual. 1
WARREN FREEDMAN, FREEDMAN'S RICHARDS ON THE LAw OF INSURANCE § 1:50, at
118 (6th ed. 1990). When the insured dies and the insurer pays the agreed

upon amount, the contract terminates. Id. Before the insured dies, he pays
designated premiums to the insurer. Id. at 119. Therefore, although the individual contract involves an element of risk, this risk is shifted from the occurrence of the condition precedent, the insured's death, to the source of funds
created by the insured's premium payments. Id. at 118.
7. See Amey Stone, Easing the Economic Burdens of Terminal Illness, Bus.
WK., May 3, 1993, at 160 (stating that assigning life insurance policy is a way
that terminally ill persons are obtaining cash to cover their increased
expenses).
8. Id.
9. See William P. Barrett, Doctors of Death, FORBES, Dec. 7, 1992, at 160
(explaining that upon death of policyholder, the viatical settlement company

collects the policy's full value).
10. See Peter Kerr, Now AIDS Patients' Lives are Drawing Speculators,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1992, at 1 (stating that the shorter the life of the viator,
the higher the return).
11. See N.Y. INS. LAw §§ 7801(a)-7802(a) (requiring viatical settlement brokers be licensed). See infra notes 45-46, 52-53 and accompanying text for a
discussion of various statutory provisions requiring that viatical settlement
brokers to be licensed.
12. See N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 7810 (granting the state insurance commissioner
the power to make any rules necessary to enforce the other statutory provisions). See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of various
statutory provisions granting state insurance commissions the power to set
minimum discount rates.
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Part III explains the development of the law regarding the free
alienation of property. Part IV analyzes how viatical settlement
statutes violate this preference for free alienation by restraining
the ability of policyholders to sell their life insurance policies. In
conclusion, Part V proposes two simple statutory changes to alleviate the harmful effects of the current statutory schemes.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE VIATICAL SETTLEMENT INDUSTRY IN

RESPONSE TO THE HIGH COST OF LIVING WITH AIDS
The viatical settlement market appeared in response to the
high cost of living with AIDS. 13 The market developed to offer
AIDS victims and other terminally ill individuals a means of living
their final years in greater financial security. 14 The market was
left open to abuse, however, by viatical companies who seek to take
several states have
advantage of vulnerable victims. In response,
5
passed legislation regulating the market.'
The viatical settlement market emerged in 1988.16 The market
developed to allow terminally ill individuals to get the money they
need now by selling their life insurance policies for less than their
13. The United States population continues to be assailed by the devasting,

tragic and enormously expensive AIDS virus. Grossman, supra note 1, at 44.

There were 242,146 reported cases of AIDS through 1992. Id. Researchers
estimate at least one million people are infected with HIV, the AIDS-causing
virus. Id.
The economic impact of AIDS is one of its most devasting effects. Id. at 46.
Professor Grossman's research reveals:
The annual cost of treating a person with AIDS is no[w) $38,300, and the
The
average cost of treating an HIV-infected person is about $10,000 ....
lifetime cost of treating a person with AIDS in the United States rose to
$102,000 in 1992, up from $85,000 in 1991. By the year 2000, it is estimated that AIDS will siphon off between $81 billion and $107 billionabout one percent of the gross domestic product.
Id. at 44. See generally ToMAs J. PHILIPSON & RICHARD A. POSNER, PRIVATE
CHOICES AND PUBLIC HEALTH: THE AIDS EPIDEMIC IN AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1993) (assessing personal and societal costs of treating AIDS).
People with AIDS suffer numerous financial hardships due to the high cost
of AIDS treatment and the debilitating nature of the disease. Scott Wilbanks,
New NationalStudy Highlights the FinancialProblems Facing the Seriously Ill,
AFFORDING CARE BULL., Jan./Feb. 1993, at 2. According to a nationwide survey
by the National Association of People with AIDS "[flinancial problems were
listed by 57.3% of [those surveyed] as their biggest day-to-day concern, making
problems with personal finances the number one problem facing this group of

people with AIDS." Id.

14. See June R. Herold, Death Benefits the Living: Industry Grows on Terminally Ill's Insurance, HOUSTON CHRON., June 7, 1992, at 9 (noting that the
use of this immediate financial security as the primary appeal to the terminally
ill). Although about 95 percent of the people who sell their life insurance policies have AIDS, people with cancer and other terminal illnesses also viaticate
their policies. Id.
15. See CAL INS. CODE §§ 10113.1-10113.2 (West 1992); N.Y. INS. LAW
§§ 7801-7810 (McKinney 1993) (imposing regulations on viatical settlements);
MODEL VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS ACT §§ 1-12 (proposed draft 1993).
16. Kerr, supra note 10, at 1.
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full value. 17 The market grew virtually overnight, as the AIDS epidemic took hold. The market exploded from one company in 1988 to
the fifty companies presently doing business.' 8
The viatical settlement market operates much like any other
industry in the open market. A terminally ill person (viator) sells
his life insurance policy to a viatical settlement company or an individual purchaser (purchaser) for a cash settlement. 19 A purchaser
usually pays a viator fifty to eighty percent of the policy's value,
depending upon the viator's life expectancy. 20 The shorter the individual's life expectancy, the more the purchaser will pay for the
21
policy.
The viator then names the purchaser as the policy's beneficiary. 2 2 While the viator still lives, the purchaser pays the premiums
17. As people who suffer from full-blown AIDS find themselves in deeper
and deeper financial difficulty, they also find themselves unable to work and
suffer a significant drop in income. Telephone Interview with Parker Willson,
President of The Gay and Lesbian Alliance of Central Texas, Inc. (Sept. 23,
1993) [hereinafter Interview with Parker Willson]. "Nearly three out of ten
(27.7%) respondents [of the NAPWA survey] live on less than $500 a month, and
another three out of ten (28.1%) live on between $500 and $1000 a month."
Wilbanks, supra note 13, at 2. The swiftly diminishing incomes of AIDS victims
force them to devote their minimal funds solely to medication, doctor bills and
rent. Interview with Parker Willson, supra. Consequently, AIDS victims are
eventually unable to pay their life insurance premiums and their policies lapse.
Id. When a life insurance policy lapses, the AIDS victim's insurance coverage
ceases and the insurance company does not have to pay the death benefits when
the former policyholder dies. Id.
18. See AFFORDING CARE, VIATICAL SETrLEMENT COMPANIES (1993); see also
Stone, supra note 7, at 160 (explaining how quickly the viatical settlement market has grown since the first company was established).
19. Kathy M. Kristof, Selling Your Insurance Policy If You're Dying, L.A.
TIMES,

Oct. 20, 1991, at 4.

20. Stone, supra note 7, at 160.
21. Herold, supra note 14, at 9.
22. The insurance industry is concerned with the possibility that former
beneficiaries may protest the loss of the insured's death benefits. AIDS writers,
Life Partners Offer ControversialFunding for AIDS Victims, Bus. WIRE, Oct.

12, 1992, at 1. Therefore, some of these companies take the precaution of hav-

ing the former beneficiary understand and approve the transaction. Id. Other
companies require the viator to get written permission from previous beneficiaries. Kristof, supra note 19, at 4.
However, according to majority law regarding insurance, life insurance policyholders may change the beneficiary of their policy if the policy terms expressly reserve the right to change the beneficiary. 1 FREEDMAN, supra note 6,
§ 3:2[h], at 220-21. Allowing the named beneficiaries to acquire vested, or unchangeable, rights to the proceeds from the life insurance policy would make it
virtually impossible for the insured to borrow on the policy in times of financial
need. Id. The assignee of an insurance policy must acquire rights to the death
benefits superior to those of the named beneficiaries. Id. Thus, when a life
insurance policy authorizes the change of beneficiary without the former beneficiary's consent, courts will uphold the insured's right to change the beneficiary
and assign his insurance policy. See Resnek v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 190 N.E.
603, 604 (Mass. 1934) (holding that the policyholder's former beneficiary, his
mother, could not receive the policyholder's death benefits where the insured
had changed the beneficiary to his sister before his death, and the terms of the
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on the policy. 2 3 When the viator dies, the purchaser receives the

death benefits and usually makes a twenty to forty percent profit on
each policy.

24

Not only have viatical companies formed for the purpose of
buying life insurance policies for themselves or other private investors, but brokers have also established their own niche in the viatical industry. 25 Viatical brokers act as intermediaries between the
policy purchasers and the viators. 26 When the broker's client enters into a viatical settlement, the brokerage firm exacts a fee for its
services. 2 7 The profit margins are high and usually require only a
few years for large returns.
Viatical settlements have become a popular way for terminally
ill individuals to try to find peace of mind and financial security in
policy provided for such a change); Slocum v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 139
N.E. 816, 817-18 (Mass. 1923) (noting that a life insurance policyholder has a
right to change the beneficiary of his policy, providing that the terms of the
policy permit such a change); Hooton v. Hooton, 203 N.W. 475, 476 (Mich. 1925)
(holding that a wife did not have a vested right as beneficiary of her husband's
life insurance policy, where the life insurance policy authorized change of beneficiary); Stahel v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 249 N.W. 713 (Minn. 1933) (holding that, even though the policy named a vested beneficiary, this beneficiary's
right was subject to the policy provision granting the insured the right to borrow from the insurer using the policy as security); Newport v. Newport, 759
S.W.2d 630, 638 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a father could not be required
to keep a life insurance policy in effect naming his minor children as beneficiaries); Ivey v. Ivey, 334 S.E.2d 123, 125 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that the
court will not force an individual to maintain a life insurance policy to support
his minor children without a just, equitable, and compelling reason to do so);
but see Pierce v. Pierce, 758 P.2d 252, 253-54 (Kan. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that
a husband's change of beneficiary on his life insurance policy had no effect
where a divorce decree provided that he maintain a life insurance policy naming his children as beneficiaries); United Parcel Service v. Riley, 532 N.Y.S.2d
473, 474 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (holding that employee's attempt to change thrift
plan beneficiary from his wife to his sister was invalid because he did not first
receive his wife's consent pursuant to the Retirement Equity Act of 1984).
23. Barrett, supra note 9, at 160.
24. Enrico, supra note 3, at 53.
25. Living Benefits Can Cure One of AIDS' Most Devastating Side Effects,
AFFORDING CARE BULL., Jan./Feb. 1993, at 8. Many viatical companies advertise in financial bulletins and other publications intended for AIDS patients,
attempting to attract viators to their companies by promising the best price for
their policy. Id. One such advertisement reads:
LIVING BENEFITS CAN CURE ONE OF AIDS' MOST DEVASTATING
SIDE EFFECTS. The fight against AIDS is tough enough. What you don't
need is a separate struggle with one of its most devastating side effects-a
struggle with serious financial problems. For many people, a life insurance
policy can provide an immediate and welcome source of cash to pay for
medical care, housing, transportation or just a vacation to rest and relax.
As a general rule, we can offer from 55% to 80% of the face value of our
client's policies. The final amount depends on a variety of factors, including
an evaluation of your medical records-which are held in strictest confidence-by our staff doctors.
Id.
26. Interview with Parker Willson, supra note 17.
27. Id.
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the final months of their lives. 28 However, this new and largely
unregulated industry has caused some concern over the possibilities for abuse, such as overreaching and undue influence upon vulnerable victims. 29

In response to these concerns, several states

have passed statutes regulating the viatical settlement market.3 0
II.

REGULATION OF THE VIATICAL SETTLEMENT MARKET

Viatical settlement regulations attempt to alleviate problems
and prevent potential abuses in the viatical settlement market.
Statutes enacted in New York,3 1 California, 32 Kansas,3 3 and New
Mexico 3 4 regulate the market by placing the viatical market under
35
the control of state insurance commissioners or administrators.
In addition, the model statute proposed by the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) contains similar provisions
3 6
which other states may use in enacting their own legislation.
28. See Martha Groves, Terminally Ill Cash In On Insurance Policies:For
AIDS Patients,Money Helps Buy Medications, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 1990, at Z9

(stating that AIDS support groups support the purchasing of policies because
the viatical settlements allow individuals to "die with dignity").
29. States Probe Life InsuranceSchemes: Firms Prey on AIDS Patients, CHI.
TRIB.,

Aug. 20, 1992, at C3. The Chicago Tribune reports that some viatical

companies have engaged in schemes to violate the viators' privacy and lure
investors into paying large amounts of money for "get rich quick" schemes at
the viators' expense. Id. These companies promised risk-free returns on the
purchasers' investments while neglecting to tell the purchasers about the potential for the viator to live longer than expected, and the potential for a cure to
the viators' illnesses. Id. Additionally, the companies provided potential investors with "menus" of dying patients. Id. These menus predicted the number of
months the viators had left to live and explained how much insurance the viators had. Id. For example, one case description provided, "[aipplicant is being
treated with (anti-viral drugs) AZT and DDI. While applicant has a low T-cell
count, his life expectancy is estimated at 12-24 months, which could be shortened by the onset of any major opportunistic disease or infection."
The Tribune article further notes that the unregulated companies have virtually free reign to conduct their advertisements in any way they please. Id.
Since there are no regulations which require the firms to register or receive a
license, investors have no way to verify this information, and policyholders have
no way to be sure they will receive payment for their policies. Id.
30. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10113.1-10113.2 (West 1992); N.Y. INS. LAw §§ 78017810 (McKinney 1993); MODEL VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS ACT §§ 1-12 (proposed
draft 1993).
31. N.Y. INS. LAw §§ 7801-7810 (McKinney 1993).
32. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10113.1-10113.2 (West 1992).
33. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-2, 140-40-2, 152 (1992).
34. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 59A-11A-1 (Michie 1993).
35. Although four states have enacted legislation of the viatical settlement
industry, this Note examines the provisions of the New York, California and
model NAIC statutes.
36. MODEL VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS ACT §§ 1-12 (proposed official draft
1993). In June 1993, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners met
to establish a draft of a model viatical settlement statute. Memorandum from
the Viatical Settlement Working Group of the Life Insurance Committee to the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (June 21, 1993) (on file with
The John Marshall Law Review). The NAIC is funded by insurance carriers in
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Although state regulation of the viatical settlement market
seeks to protect viators, these statutes all contain two problematic
provisions. First, the statutes give state insurance commissioners
the power to set minimum discount rates for the sale of the life insurance policies. 3 7 Second, the statutes require licensing for individual purchasers who do not represent viatical companies or
brokers. 38 These statutory provisions limit the price viators may
accept for their policies and limit the number of people to whom
viators may sell their policies.
A.

General Statutory Provisions

Viatical settlement statutes delineate requirements and proce39
dures for the process of buying and selling life insurance policies.
These requirements are designed to protect viators by ensuring
that purchasers do not try enter into unfair transactions or take
advantage of a viator's vulnerability. 40 The statutory procedures
provide that the insurance commissioner of each state ensure compliance by viatical settlement companies and individual
each state. Interview with Parker Willson, supra note 17. The draft was revised in August 1993 and is currently pending adoption by the NAIC. Interview
with Carolyn Johnson, Representative of the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners Legal Department, Kansas City, Mo. (Sep. 13, 1993). If
adopted, the model statute will become the suggested model for all states wishing to regulate the viatical settlement industry. Id.
37. See, e.g.', CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.2(f) (West 1992); N.Y. INS. LAW § 7810

(McKinney 1993);

MODEL VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS ACT

§ 10(B) (proposed draft

1993); see also infra note 49 and accompanying text discussing the statutory
minimum discount rate provisions in detail.
38. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.2(b)(1); N.Y. INs. LAw § 7802(a);
MODEL VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS ACT

§ 3(A). According to the California, New

York, and NAIC statutes, any individual seeking to purchase a life insurance
policy or to act as a broker for the sale of a life insurance policy must be licensed
by the state in which he resides.
39. See generally CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10113.1-10113.2; N.Y. INs. LAW
§§ 7801-7810; MODEL VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS ACT §§ 1-12. See, e.g., CAL. INS.
CODE

§ 10113.2; N.Y.

INS. LAw

§ 7802;

MODEL VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS ACT

§3

(providing an extensive list of rules and regulations which settlement companies must comply in order to receive and retain their licenses); CAL. INs. CODE
§ 10113.2; N.Y. INS. LAW § 7808; MODEL V1ATICAL SETTLEMENTS ACT § 9 (subjecting disclosure of medical records under viatical statutes to state laws concerning the confidentiality of medical information); CAL. INs. CODE
§ 10113.2(m)-(n); N.Y. INs. LAw § 7804, 7808; MODEL VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS
ACT §§ 9, 11 (forbidding licensees to engage in false or misleading advertising
and requiring a rescission period for any viatical settlement).
40. See infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text discussing statutory regulations protecting viators. In addition to the provisions outlined therein, the
regulations also require full disclosure to viators of information about possible
alternatives to viatical settlements, tax consequences of settlement, and possible cessation of public assistance due to the proposed increase in income. See,
e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.2(d); N.Y. Ins. Law § 7807; MODEL SETTLEMENTS
ACT § 8.
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purchasers.
The motivation behind viatical settlement statutes is paternalistic. Viatical statutes seek to ensure that viators understand and
voluntarily agree to the viatical settlement contract and its provisions. The statutes require a purchaser to procure a witnessed,
signed statement attesting that the viator freely and voluntarily
consents to the viatical contract, acknowledges the terminal illness,
understands both the settlement and the benefits of the life insurance policy, and releases his or her medical records to the viatical
settlement company or broker. 4 2 Moreover, any purchaser entering
into a viatical settlement contract with a viator must obtain a written statement from a medical professional affirming that the viator
43
is not acting under undue influence.
The statutes also attempt to protect viators by subjecting viatical companies and brokers to extensive oversight, regulation, and
control by the insurance commissioner or administrator of each
41. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.2(b)(1); N.Y. INS. LAw § 7802(a);
MODEL VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS ACT

§ 3(A) (providing that insurance commis-

sioners control the issuing of licenses and the administrative oversight of all
companies and individuals seeking to buy a terminally ill person's life insurance policy in the state).
The insurance commissioner has broad discretion in exercising his statutory authority. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.2(c); N.Y. INS. LAw § 7804;
MODEL VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS ACT § 5 (requiring that viatical companies submit settlement contracts to the commissioner, who must then disapprove any
form if he deems its wording or provisions jeopardize the best interests of the
public); CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.2(h); N.Y. INS. LAw § 7806; MODEL VIATICAL
SETTLEMENTS ACT § 7 (requiring viatical companies submit to investigation by
the insurance commissioner at any time he deems such an investigation necessary); CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.2(g); N.Y. INs. LAw § 7807; MODEL VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS ACT § 8 (requiring viatical companies to participate in full disclosure
of company business records, investors and financial records at the commissioner's request); see also CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.2; N.Y. INS. LAw § 7806;
MODEL VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS ACT § 7 (granting commissioners the power to

issue orders to licensees, to examine any records, files, etc., of a company, and to
impose fines for non-compliance with the statute itself or orders given pursuant
to the regulations).
42. See CAL INs. CODE § 10113.1(c)(1)-(2) (West 1992); N.Y. INS. LAw
§ 7808(a) (McKinney 1993); MODEL VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS ACT § 9(A)(2) (requiring a purchaser to procure a witnessed, signed statement attesting that the
viator freely and voluntarily consented to the viatical contract, acknowledges
the terminal illness, understands both the settlement and the benefits of the
life insurance policy, and releases his or her medical records to the viatical settlement company or broker).
43. See CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.1(c)(1); N.Y. INS. LAw § 7808(a); MODEL VI-

§ (9)(A)(1). Most viatical companies procure these affidavits from physicians whom the companies themselves hire in order to insure
ATICAL SETTLEMENTS ACT

an accurate, unbiased estimate of the viators' life expectancy. Barrett, supra
note 9, at 1. The medical professional and the viator must also attest that the
viator possesses sufficient mental capacity to understand his actions with regard to the settlement. CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.1(c)(1); N.Y. INS. LAw § 7808(a);
MODEL VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS ACT

§ 9(A)(1).
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state. 44 Potential purchasers must apply for licenses from the
in45 If
surance commissioner before transacting viatical settlements.
a purchaser complies with the statute's regulations and the insurance commissioner's orders, the commissioner approves the licensing application. 4 6 Thus, the statutory procedures appear to
adequately protect the interests of viators.
B. Problems with Viatical Settlement Regulations
Although the general protections of viatical settlement statutes
are warranted, the statutes contain provisions which harm viators
by limiting their right to sell their insurance policies. There are
two problematic provisions of viatical settlement statutes. First,
the statutes delegate power to the insurance commissioners to set
minimum discount rates for viatical settlements. 4 7 Second, the
statutes require not only viatical settlement companies and viatical
settlement brokers to be licensed, but also provide that individual
purchasers who do not represent a company or a broker must ob48
tain a license before purchasing a viator's insurance policy.

1. The Insurance Commissioner's Power to Set Minimum
Discount Rates for the Sale of Insurance Policies
The California, New York, and NAIC statutes give state insurance commissioners the power to make any rules necessary to regulate the industry. 4 9 These rules include the regulation of discount
rates used to determine the minimum amount paid on viatical set44. See supra note 39 for examples of state insurance commissioners' broad
statutory authority.
45. See CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10113.1-10113.2; N.Y. INS. LAw §§ 7801-7810;
MODEL VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS ACT §§ 1-12. The commissioner has the discretion to approve or deny the application for a license. CAL. INS. CODE
§ 10113.2(c); N.Y. INS. LAw § 7802(f); MODEL VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS ACT § 3(F).
Moreover, the commissioner may revoke any license after a hearing if he feels it
is in the best interest of the public to do so. CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.2(j); N.Y.
INS. LAw § 7803(a); MODEL VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS ACT § 4(A).
46. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10113.1-10113.2; N.Y. INS. LAw §§ 7801-7810; MODEL
VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS ACT §§ 1-12.
47. See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text for an explanation of how
the statutes delegate power to the insurance commissioner to set minimum discount rates.
48. See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text for an explanation of the
requirement that individual purchasers be licensed to purchase viators' insurance policies.
49. CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.2(f); N.Y. INS. LAW § 7810; MODEL VIATICAL SET.
TLEMENTS ACT § 10(B). Although the California and NAIC statutes explicitly
give the insurance commissioner the power to set minimum discount rates for
the insurance policies, the New York statute does not explicitly give him this
power. However, section 7810 of the New York statute gives the commissioner
the power to make any rules necessary to enact the other statutory provisions.
N.Y. INS. LAw § 7810. Since the statutes are designed to protect the viators and
ensure that they get fair prices for their policies, section 7810 can easily be
extended to include the power to set minimum discount rates. Therefore, the
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tlements.5 ° This means, in effect, that the commissioner can set
minimum rates for which viators may sell their life insurance policies. For example, the commissioner can dictate that every viatical
settlement contract require payment of at least fifty percent of the
face value of the policy. Consequently, the statutes limit the
rate at
51
which viators can choose to sell their insurance policies.
Proponents of the provision intended minimum discount rates
to assist viators in obtaining a respectable price for their life insurance policies. 5 2 Minimum discount rates prevent viatical settle53
ment companies from offering prices below a certain rate.
Proponents assert that mininum discount rates are necessary because viators are in a highly emotional state due to the knowledge
that they will soon die. 54 Consequently, minimum discount rates

purportedly protect viators from accepting unreasonably low prices
for their policies.5 5 However, as will be discussed, these paternalistic protections often have the effect of harming potential viators
with these restrictions.
2. The Requirement that Individual PurchasersBe Licensed
The California, New York, and NAIC statutes require that
every purchaser entering into a viatical settlement be licensed by
the state insurance commissioner to transact business within the
state. 56 The statutes expressly provide that both viatical compaNew York insurance commissioners also have the power to set minimum discount rates for the insurance policies.
50. See Cal. Ins. Code § 10113.2(f); N.Y. INS. LAW § 7810; MODEL VIATICAL
10(B).
51. See infra notes 91-129 and accompanying text for a discussion of the

SETTLEMENTS ACT §

consequences of requiring life insurance policies be sold at minimum discount
rates.
52. Interview with David Petersen, supra note 93 (discussing the purpose of
minimum discount rates and how they are meant to help viators); see also S.
5303, 216th Legis., Reg. Sess. 1993 N.Y. Laws, STAFF OF SENATOR GUY J. VELLELLA, 216TH LEGIS., REG. SESS., INTRODUCTORY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF

BILL 5303, at 1-2 (1993) (discussing the overall purpose of the law, which is to
protect viators).
53. Interview with David Petersen, supra note 93 (explaining the purpose
of minimum discount rates).
54. Letter from Gay Men's Health Crisis to Senator Guy J. Vellella, (May
25, 1993) [on file with The John MarshallLaw Review] (discussing the proposition that viators need special protection because they are vulnerable to overreaching).
55. Interview with David Petersen, supra note 93 (arguing against minimum discount rates, but explaining the purported reasons for including them in
viatical settlement laws); see also Letter form Gay Men's Health Crisis to Senator Guy J. Vellella, (May 25, 1993) [on file with The John MarshallLaw Review]
(arguing that the statutory provisions protect the viaters by making sure their
viatical settlement contracts are fair in all aspects, including pricing).
56. See CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10113.1(a)-10113.2(a)-(b); N.Y. INS. LAw §§ 78017802(a); MODEL VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS ACT §§ 2-3(A).
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nies and individual purchasers must be licensed. 57 Thus, under the
broad language of the statute, a private investor involved in a single viatical settlement must comply with the same licensing requirements as a company in the business of buying and selling life
insurance policies.
In addition, the New York Act requires viatical settlement companies, brokers and individual purchasers to inform viators of their
options and the consequences of transacting a settlement. 58 Individual purchasers, like companies and brokers, also must advise viators to seek legal and financial advice before completing the
settlement. 5 9 Finally, the Act requires individual purchasers to
join viatical companies and brokers in full financial disclosure and
60
the payment of yearly licensing fees to the commissioner.
Both the minimum discount rates provisions and the individual
licensing requirements stifle a viator's ability to take full advantage
of the viatical settlement market. These statutory provisions impair a viator's right to sell their insurance policies. Consequently, a
terminally ill individual's ability to combat his financial difficuties
is frustrated by state regulations interfering with his right to freely
alienate his property.
III.

THE PREFERENCE FOR FREE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY

The general rule in United States law is to allow the free alienation of real and personal property. Courts have carved out exceptions to this rule where policy considerations dictate the need for
limitations on the right to sell one's property. In the context of viat-

ical settlement statutes, however, these policy considerations do not
mandate an exception.
A.

The Preference Against Restraints on Alienation of Property.
In general, United States law demonstrates a preference for

57. See CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10113.1-10113.2(a)-(b) (stating "[n]o person may
enter into or solicit viatical settlements pursuant to Section 10113.1 unless that
person has been licensed by the commissioner under this section."); N.Y. INS.
LAw §§ 7801(a)-7802(a) (stating "[n]o individual, partnership, corporation or
other entity may act as a viatical settlement company or broker or enter into or
solicit a viatical settlement without first having obtained a license from the superintendent. .. ."); MODEL VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS ACT §§ 2-3(A) (stating "[n]o
individual, partnership, corporation or other entity may act as a viatical settlement provider or enter into or solicit a viatical settlement contract without first
having obtained a license from the Commissioner.").
58. N.Y. INS. LAw § 7807; see also MODEL VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS ACT §§ 39.
59. See N.Y. Ins. Law § 7807; see also MODEL VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS ACT
§§ 3-9.
60. See N.Y. INS. LAw §§ 7802-7809; see also MODEL VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS
ACT §§ 3-9.
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the free alienation of property61 or entitlements. 62 Entitlements
are rights or interests in property which receive protection from the
state, such as the right to possess and transfer personal property
without interference from others.6 3 Owners of entitlements such as
land, tangible personal property, and securities may transfer these
64
protected rights by contract.
Under basic property rules which protect entitlements, someone who wishes to take the entitlement from its owner must usually
purchase it first from the owner for the owner's agreed upon
price. 6 5 Usually, the government does not intervene by trying to
decide the entitlement's value. 6 6 Instead, each party ultimately
61. See Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation of Human Capital, 79

L. REV. 383, 384-86 (1993) (arguing against restraints on the alienation of
human capital and giving an overview of restraints on alienation in employment law, debtor creditor law, and family law); Richard A. Epstein, Why Re-

VA.

strain Alienation, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970 (1985) ("The right of alienation, as

part of the bundle of property rights, is set in opposition to the rights of possession and use. The types of property to which it can extend are real and personal, tangible and intangible."); see also Citgo Petroleum Corp. v. Hopper, 429
S.E.2d 6, 7 (Va. 1993); Sheilds v. Moffit, 683 P.2d 530, 533 (Okla. 1984); Metro.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 652 S.W.2d 820, 822 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983); McGinnis v. McGinnis, 391 P. 2d 927 (Wyo. 1964); Peiter v. Degenring, 71 A.2d 87, 89 (Conn.
1949); Keeling v. Keeling, 203 S.W.2d 601 (Tenn. 1947).

62. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Alienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARv. L. REV. 1089, 1090

(1972) (establishing an approach for examining the concept of entitlements and
their alienability using both tort and property law principles); see also Crosswell Enter., Inc. v. Arnold, 422 S.E.2d 157, 159 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992); Horse Pond
Fish & Game Club, Inc. v. Cormier, 581 A.2d 478, 480 (N.H. 1990); Nat'l Consultants, Inc. v. Burt, 366 S.E.2d 344, 348-49 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988); Benson v.
Greenville Nat'l Exch. Bank, 113 S.W.2d 918, 923 (Tex. Ct. App. 1953); In re
Estate of Sahlender, 201 P.2d 69 (1st Cir. 1949).
63. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 62, at 1090; see also Castriota v. Castriota, 633 A.2d 1024, 1027 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993); Dixie Pipe Sales,
Inc. v. Perry, 834 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992); Gray v. Harris Land &
Cattle Co., 737 P.2d 475, 476 (Mont. 1986); Tracey v. Franklin, 67 A.2d 56, 5859 (Del. 1949); Ramage v. First Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank of Troy, 30
So. 2d 706, 711 (Ala. 1947).
64. See Sterk, supra note 61, at 383 ("[F]reedom of contract remains an organizing principal for much corporate and commercial law."); Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353,
1354 (1982) ("In general, there is a very strong case for applying the doctrine of
freedom of contract to the rights and duties between the parties.. . ."); see, e.g.,

Hieb v. Opp, 458 N.W.2d 797, 801 (S.D. 1989); First Nat'l Bank of Vicksburg v.
Caruthers, 443 S.2d 861, 864 (Miss. 1983); Johnson v. R.H. Donnelly Co., 402
So. 2d 518, 520 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Memorial Gardens Ass'n v. Smith,
156 N.E.2d 587, 595 (Ill. 1959); Gazzam v. Bldg. Serv. Employees Int'l Union,
188 P.2d 97, 102 (Wash. 1947); see also Sterk, supra note 61, at 383.
65. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 62, at 1092; see also Crosswell Enter.,
Inc. v. Arnold, 422 S.E.2d 157, 159 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992); Benson v. Greenville
Nat'l Exch. Bank, S.W.2d 918, 923 (Tex. Ct. App. 1953).
66. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 62, at 1092; see also Castriota v. Castriota, 633 A.2d 1024, 1027 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993); Crosswell Enter.,
Inc. v. Arnold, 422 S.E.2d 157, 159 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992); Nat'l Consultants, Inc.
v. Burt, 366 S.E.2d 344, 348-49 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988); Benson v. Greenville Nat'l
Exch. Bank, S.W. 2d 918, 923 (Tex. Ct. App. 1953); Tracey v. Franklin, 67 A.2d
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reaches an agreed upon exchange by independently determining
67
how much the entitlement is worth to him.
68
The preference for free alienability rests on three principles.
First, unlimited alienability of property ensures that property will
go to those individuals who value it most.69 Second, free alienabil56, 58-59 (Del. 1949); Gazzam v. Bldg. Serv. Employees Int'l Union, 188 P.2d
97, 102 (Wash. 1947).
67. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 62, at 1092; see also Hieb v. Opp, 458
N.W.2d 797, 801 (S.D. 1989); Nat'l Consultants, Inc. v. Burt, 366 S.E.2d 344,
348-49 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988); Johnson v. R.H. Donnelly Co., 402 So. 2d 518, 520
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Gazzam v. Bldg. Serv. Employees Int'l Union, 188
P.2d 97, 102 (Wash. 1947).
68. Sterk, supra note 61, at 383, 384.
69. For example, both English and American courts have long exhibited a
preference against restrictive covenants, or covenants not to compete, because
such covenants operate as restraints on trade, and prevent individuals from
selling their property to those whose market behavior shows they value the
property most. Sterk, supra note 61, at 387. Several states have statutes which
provide that these restrictive covenants and other general restraints on alienation are unenforceable. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 35-4-4 (1993) (applying common
law rule against restraints on alienation to personal property); ARiz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 33-261 (1993) (applying rules against restraints on alienation to personal property); CAL.CIV. CODE § 711 (West 1993) (mandating that conditions
restraining alienation are void); MONT.CODE ANN. § 70-1-405 (1991) (providing
that conditions restraining alienation are void).
Often, courts will refuse to enforce restrictive or non-competition covenants
that prevent individuals from selling their property to those who value the
property most. See, e.g., Cagan v. Intervest Midwest Real Estate Corp., 774 F.
Supp. 1089, 1093 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding that as a general rule, restraints
against alienation are void); Hapney v. Cent. Garage, Inc., 579 So. 2d 127, 134
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that covenants not to compete per se violate
public policy and are void, and an employer must prove an underlying protected
interest such as trade secrets and customer lists in order to enforce such a covenant); Gale v. York Center Community Coop., Inc., 171 N.E.2d 30, 33 (Ill. 1961)
(holding that restraints on alienation are generally void even when limited in
time, and mandating that restraints on alienation will only be enforced when
reasonably designed to achieve accepted social or economic ends); Low v. Spellman, 629 A.2d 57, 59 (Me. 1993) (holding that right of first refusal to buy property for a certain sum was void as an unreasonable restraint on alienation
because it extended to heirs and assigns); Village of Pinehurst v. Regional Inv.
of Moore, 412 S.E.2d 645, 647 (N.C. 1992) (holding that the right of first refusal
for the sale of sewage and water systems created an unenforceable restraint on
alienation, because this first refusal right was unlimited in duration); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 187 (1979) ("Apromise to refrain from
competition that imposes a restraint that is not ancillary to an otherwise valid
transaction or relationship is unreasonably in restraint of trade."). However,
courts enforce restrictive covenants in some situations, providing the covenants
not to compete and restraints on alienation are reasonable. Sterk, supra note
61, at 387; see also Kerley v. Nu-West, Inc., 762 P.2d 631, 635 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1988) (holding a restraint on alienation will be upheld when it does not restrict
alienation for an unreasonable duration); All Stainless, Inc. v. Colby, 308
N.E.2d 481, 485 (Mass. 1974) (holding that a covenant not to compete will be
enforced if it is reasonable, based on all the circumstances); Stenke v. Masland
Dev. Co., Inc., 394 N.W.2d 418, 422 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a contract giving an individual the right of first refusal for the purchase of a gas
station did not constitute an unreasonable restraint on alienation because the
agreement did not limit the price of the premises); Orthotic & Prosthetic Lab,
Inc. v. Pott, 851 S.W.2d 633, 639-40 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that noncom-
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ity helps to control the market system by increasing the production
of goods that buyers want and decreasing the production of unwanted goods. 70 Third, free alienability increases an individual's
71
ability to make choices concerning the quality of his life.
B.

Situations Where Government Allows Restraints
on Alienation

In situations which involve certain economic and social policy
petition covenant in agreement to sell defendant's business was enforceable and
assignable under the terms of the agreement); Metro. Transp. Auth. v. Bruken
Realty Corp., 492 N.E.2d 379, 385 (N.Y. 1986) (holding that restraints on alienation will be enforced providing that they are reasonable in terms of duration,
price, and purpose); Reed, Roberts Assoc., Inc. v Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590, 593
(N.Y. 1976) (holding that restrictive covenants are enforceable to the extent
necessary to stop disclosure of trade secrets or privileged customer
information).
70. See Sterk, supra note 61, at 383, 384; see also ALA. CODE § 8-1-1 (1993)
(providing that contracts restraining business are void); ALA. CODE § 8-10-1
(1993) (making price fixing illegal); ALA. CODE § 8-10-3 (1993) (making monopolies of businesses or industries illegal); ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.562 (1992) (making combinations in restraint of trade unlawful); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 16600 (West 1992) (making contracts in restraint of trade and free market
action illegal); 740 ILCS 10/2 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (promoting growth of commerce by forbidding restraints on competition and trade); IND. CODE ANN. § 241-2-1 (West 1993) (making monopolies or combinations in restraint of trade illegal); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-1-2-3 (West 1993) (forbidding schemes or contracts to
restrain free competition for the letting of contracts for public or private work);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-101 (1992) (declaring trusts which carry out restraints on
competition and market activity void); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 445.772 (West
1993) (making combinations in restraint of trade and market competition illegal); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 340 (McKinney 1993) (making contracts in restraint
of trade illegal); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 369-a (McKinney 1993) (forbidding price
fixing in the resale of commodities); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 186 (1979) ("A promise is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if it is
unreasonably in restraint of trade. A promise is in restraint of trade if its performance would limit competition in any business or restrict the promisor in the
exercise of a gainful occupation."); Epstein, supra note 61, at 972. Epstein
wrote that:
Most voluntary transactions move property from lower to higher value
uses. The purchase price is greater than the value of the property to the
seller, else he will not part with it. Yet it must be less than the value of the
property in use to the buyer, else he will not purchase it. When total transaction costs exceed the difference in values to the buyer and the seller, then
the exchange cannot go forward, since both parties no longer will emerge as
net winners.)
Id. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability,100 HARv. L. REV. 1849,
1889 (1987) ("'[I]mplied in property' is the right to whatever a producer can get
for her products 'in a fair market.'" (quoting J.S. Mill, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY BK. II 221 (Washley ed. 1909))).
71. See Sterk, supra note 61, at 382, 384; see also Potter v. Chamberlain, 73
N.W.2d 844, 846 (Mich. 1955) (holding that a property owner may dispose of her
property as she sees fit, providing she is competent to do so and is subject to no
undue influences); Berthuine v. Scewczyk, 26 N.W.2d 770, 772 (Mich. 1947)
(holding that a property owner who does not act under undue influence and who
is mentally competent may dispose of her property as she wishes).
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considerations, lawmakers limit the alienation of entitlements. 7 2
An entitlement is inalienable when the law prevents its transfer
from a willing seller to a willing buyer.7 3 In these situations, the
government dictates who owns the commodity and how much that
74
individual must be paid if the entitlement is taken or destroyed.
The government may also forbid the entitlement's sale under some
or all circumstances. 75 In determining whether to restrain alienation, courts balance the preference toward free alienation against
76
the interest in protecting the general public's rights.
Courts apply inalienability rules in three situations.7 7 First,
courts limit alienability of an entitlement when the transaction creates economic inefficiencies in the form of externalities, or costs to
third parties. 78 Economically inefficient externalities occur when
the sale of one person's entitlement reduces the value of someone
else's entitlement. 79 Costs to third parties also occur when it is
difficult or undesirable to determine an objective value of the prop72. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 62, at 1092; see also Daigle v. Clemco

Indus., 613 So. 2d 619, 620 (La. 1993); First Nat'l Bank of Vicksburg v. Caruthers, 443 So. 2d 861, 864 (Miss. 1983); Gale v. York Ctr. Community Coop., Inc.,
171 N.E.2d 30, 33 (Ill. 1960); Memorial Gardens Ass'n v. Smith, 156 N.E.2d
587, 595 (Ill. 1959); Autumn Corp. v. Lederman, 95 N.Y.S.2d 57, 61 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1949); Hooten v. Carson, 209 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Tenn. 1948); Bounty Ballroom v. Bain, 211 S.W.2d 248, 251 (Tex. 1948); Callanan Rd. Improvement Co.
v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., Inc. 72 N.Y.S.2d 194, 196 (N.Y. App. Div. 1947);
Blum v. Engelman, 57 A.2d 421, 423 (Md. 1948); Carlton v. Manuel, 187 P.2d
558, 562 (Nev. 1947); Jorgenson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 55 A.2d 2, 4 (N.J. 1947).
73. See Richard E. Manning, The Development of Restraints on Alienation
Since Gray, 48 HARv. L. REV. 373 (1935) ("Restrictions upon the grantee's right
to transfer the property, at any time, to whomsoever he may choose, and in
whatever manner he may select, are called 'restraints on alienation.'").
74. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 62, at 1092, 1093; see also Memorial
Gardens Ass'n v. Smith, 156 N.E.2d 587, 595 (Ill. 1959); City of Akron v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 78 N.E.2d 890, 895 (Ohio 1948); Hooten v. Carson, 209 S.W.2d
273, 275 (Tenn. 1948); Bounty Ballroom v. Bain, 211 S.W.2d 248, 251 (Tex.
1948); Blum v. Engelman, 57 A.2d 421, 423 (Md. 1948).
75. Id.
76. Manning, supra note 73, at 373; see also Cagan v. Intervest Midwest
Real Estate Corp., 774 F. Supp. 1089, 1093 (N.D. Ill., 1991) (holding that a restraint "may be sustained ... when it is reasonably designed to attain or encourage accepted social or economic ends").
77. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 62, at 1111.
78. See, e.g., Custer Pub. Power Dist. v. Loup River Pub. Power, 75 N.W.2d
619, 628 (Neb. 1956); Hooten v. Carson, 209 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Tenn. 1948); Carlton v. Manuel, 187 P.2d 558, 562 (Nev. 1947); Jorgenson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
55 A.2d 2, 4 (N.J. 1947).
79. This occurs, for example, when A sells his property to B, who will then
proceeds to pollute A's former property. C, who lives next door to A, will suffer
a decrease in the value of his property due to A's complete freedom to alienate
his property to B, a polluter. Id.; see also Epstein, supra note 61, at 1354 ("A
conveyance that states that a prospective purchaser shall not be liable for nuisances caused to third parties will have no effect upon the right of any third
party to maintain a cause of action for nuisance.").
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erty, as in the case of human capital such as degrees or licenses.8 0
Second, restraints on alienation result when private contracting creates undesirable external consequences, as in the case
of monopolies which hurt the public.8 1 External costs may also
take the form of moralisms, where third parties take offense at the
prospect of an individual selling an entitlement.8 2 For example,
courts may protect a property owner's liberty by refusing to allow
83
him to alienate his human capital, or to sell himself into slavery.
The third concern which prompts restraints on alienability is
self paternalism, where rules exist to prevent individuals from
80. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 62, at 1112; see also Sterk, supra note
61, at 385 ("[A] variety of well-established legal rules impede the transfer of
human productive capacities, often called 'human capital.'").
81. Sterk, supra note 61, at 387. To prevent contracts whereby parties

agree to create a monopoly of a particular industry or to fix prices on a certain
commodity, many states make such agreements illegal. See supra note 70 (listing the state statutes and each relative prohibition).
82. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 62, at 1112. A situation involving a
moralism would be, for example, where a state allows A to sell herself into prostitution, to take undue risks of becoming penniless, or to sell a kidney. As a
result, B may be harmed because he hates to see someone selling her body for
money, becoming a pauper, or someone who suffers because she has sold a vital
organ. See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 266f (West 1992)(making the sale of a person for immoral purposes illegal); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.454 (West
1993)(making the leasing of premises for the purpose of prostitution illegal);
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.457 (West 1993)(making accepting the earnings
of a prostitute illegal); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.462 (West 1993)(making
the keeping of a female in a house of prostitution illegal); N.Y. PENAL LAw
§ 230.04 (McKinney 1993)(making patronizing a prostitute illegal); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9.6A.100 (West 1992) (making patronizing a juvenile prostitute
illegal); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.88.030 (West 1992)(making prostitution in
general illegal); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.88.080 (West 1992)(making the
promotion of prostitution illegal).
83. Sterk, supra note 61, at 387. In order to prevent individuals from contracting to sell themselves into slavery, courts refuse to enforce involuntary servitudes and do not order specific performance of personal service contracts. See,
e.g., Woolley v. Embassy Suites, Inc., 278 Cal. Rptr. 719, 727 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991) (holding that courts will not compel specific performance of personal service contracts, because this would violate the thirteenth amendment's provision
against involuntary servitude); Montaner v. Big Show Prod., 620 So. 2d 246,
248 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the remedy of specific performance
is not available to compel a singer to perform, because courts will not compel
personal service on the part of an individual); Clark v. Clark, 288 N.W.2d 1, 11
(Minn. 1979) (refusing to order specific performance of an individual's promise
to make a will); American Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Wolf, 420 N.E.2d 363, 366
(N.Y. 1981) (holding that courts are reluctant to enforce by specific performance
personal service contracts not to compete); State v. Brownson, 459 N.W.2d 877,
880 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that criminalizing the breach of a labor contract constitutes involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amend-

ment);

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §

367 (1979)("A promise to render

personal service will not be specifically enforced."); but see Johnson v. Calvert,
19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494, 496 (Cal. 1993) (holding that gestational surrogacy contracts do not constitute involuntary servitude); Warwick v. Warwick, 438
N.W.2d 673, 679 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a court order requiring a
former husband to find employment did not constitute involuntary servitude).
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yielding to harmful momentary temptations.8 4 For example, courts
commonly refuse to enforce contracts completed by intoxicated
85
individuals.
Inalienability rules may also exist to prevent sales agreements
which do not reflect what the parties would have agreed to had they
86
possessed the same information or equal bargaining power.
Courts restrain alienability where the owner of an entitlement
87
owner cannot choose for himself whether to sell his entitlement.
For example, courts place restrictions on contracts formed by mi84. These restraints on alienation simply allow the individual to choose
what is ultimately best for him, despite the fact that such a choice deprives him
at first of some freedom to alienate his entitlements. Calabresi & Melamed,
supra note 62, at 1113. Self-paternalism may cause us to mandate that certain
conditions must be fulfilled before an entitlement may be sold. Id.
85. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 62, at 1113; see also Miner v. Walden,
422 N.Y.S.2d 335, 339 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979) (holding that contract between doctor and patient where patient agreed to arbitrate all claims against the doctor
and the doctor agreed to arbitrate all claims for payment was unenforceable
and unconscionable due to unequal bargaining power and the fact that only the
doctor benefitted from the agreement); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 16 (1979) ("A person incurs only voidable contractual duties by entering into a
transaction if the other party has reason to know that by reason of intoxication
(a) he is unable to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and consequences of the transaction, or (b) he is unable to act in a reasonable manner in
relation to the transaction."); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.6, at 227
(1982) ("Intoxication may also render a party unable to understand the nature
and consequences of the transaction.").
86. Sterk, supra note 61, at 387; see also Wilson v. World Omni Leasing,
Inc., 540 So. 2d 713, 716 (Ala. 1989) (holding that rescission of contract due to
unconscionability is a remedy reserved for the unsophisticated and uneducated); Lloyd v. Service Corp. of Alabama, Inc., 453 So. 2d 735, 741 (Ala. 1984)
(holding that a lessor seeking to enforce an exculpatory clause must prove that
the lessee understood the provisions and there was an actual and voluntary
meeting of the minds with regard to the clause); General Bargain Ctr. v. American Alarm Co., Inc., 430 N.E.2d 407, 411 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that
exculpatory clauses will not be enforced where the parties have unequal bargaining power, or where contract is unconscionable); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS §§ 178, 208 (1979). The Restatement provides, in pertinent part, as

follows:
A promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of
public policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or the interest

in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public
policy against the enforcement of such terms. If a contract or term thereof
is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court may refuse to
enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without
the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.
Id. § 178. The courts consider contemporary social attitudes when determining
whether restraints on alienation will protect incompetent and unwise individuals. Manning, supra note 73, at 374.
87. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 62, at 1113; see, e.g., Bulter v. Harrison, 578 A.2d 1098, 1100 (D.C. 1990); In re Keiss, 353 N.E.2d 13, 16 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1976); Charles Melbourne & Sons, Inc. v. Jesset, 163 N.E.2d 773, 776 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1960); Potter v. Chamberlain, 73 N.W.2d 844, 846 (Mich. 1955); Berthuine v. Scewczyk, 26 N.W.2d 770 (Mich. 1947).
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nors,8 8 mental incompetents and incapacitated individuals. 8 9
Restraints on alienation are generally disfavored. Notwithstanding, courts have carved out specific exceptions restricting free
alienation where overriding policy considerations dictate. An individual's right to sell his life insurance policy, however, is not one of
those exceptions.

IV.

RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION AS APPLIED TO THE VIATICAL
SETTLEMENT MARKET

Viatical settlement statutes seek to protect viators from unfair
and overreaching activities of purchasers. Admittedly, these are
valid goals. As a whole, regulatory statutes serve a valuable purpose. However, minimum discount rates and individual licensing
requirements imposed by regulatory statutes restrict a viator's ability to sell his life insurance policy. Thus, these provisions interfere
with a viator's right to freely alienate his property.
88. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 62 at 1113; see also D.H. Holmes Co.

v. Rena, 34 So. 2d 813, 815 (La. Ct. App. 1948) (holding that a contract for the
purchase of property by a seventeen year old girl was void when made and did

not render her liable for the purchase price); Hines v. Cheshire, 219 P.2d 100,

104 (Wash. 1950) (holding that an infant disaffirming his contract is required to
return only what remains of the item which the infant received as consideration
for the contract, and the infant is not responsible for that portion disposed of,
lost, or wasted during his infancy); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 14
(1979) ("Unless a statute provides otherwise, a natural person has the capacity
to incur only voidable contractual duties until the beginning of the day before
the person's eighteenth birthday.").
89. See Taylor v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 143, 148 (W.D. Ark. 1953)
(holding that, in order to be capable of effecting a valid change of beneficiary
under an insurance policy, a person should know the nature of his property, the
nature of the act he is about to perform, and his relationship to his new beneficiary); Harrison v. City Nat'l Bank of Clinton, 210 F. Supp. 362, 368 (S.D. Iowa
1962) (holding that a person cannot form a trust when he is incapable of understanding the nature and effect of the trust, and is incapable of understanding
and acting with discretion in the ordinary affairs of life); Butler v. Harrison,
578 A.2d 1098, 1099 (D.C. 1990) (holding that the "[t]est of mental capacity to
contract is whether the person in question possessed sufficient mind to understand, in reasonable manner, nature, extent, character, and effect of the particular transaction in which she is engaged, and whether or not she is competent
in transacting business generally."); In re Keiss, 353 N.E.2d 13, 16 (Ill. App. Ct.
1976) (holding that a contract entered into by a person lacking mental capacity
to contract is voidable); Charles Melbourne & Sons, Inc. v. Jesset, 163 N.E.2d
773, 775 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960) (holding that the contract of a mentally incompetent person is voidable); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 12, 15 (1979).
The Restatement states:
No one can be bound by contract who has not legal capacity to incur at least
voidable contractual duties. Capacity to contract may be partial and its
existence in respect of a particular transaction may depend upon the nature of the transaction or upon other circumstances. A person incurs only
voidable contractual duties by entering into a transaction if by reason of
mental illness or defect (a) he is unable to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and consequences of the transaction, or (b) he is unable to
act in a reasonable manner in relation to the transaction and the other
party has reason to know of his condition.
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The statutory provisions do not fit into any one of the three
situations in which courts allow restraints on alienation. 90 To the
contrary, the basic premise of the viatical settlement market is consistent with the three underlying principles of free alienation. 9 1
Thus, to the extent that minimum discount rates and individual licensing requirements limit aviator's ability to sell his life insurance policy, these statutory regulations place a restraint on a
viator's right to freely alienate his property.
A.

Statutory Minimum Discount Rates Violate the Rule
Requiring Free Alienation

Statutory provisions allowing state insurance commissioners to
set minimum discount rates violate each of the principles of free
alienation. First, these provisions prevent goods from going to
those who most value them. Second, minimum discount rates prevent free alienation from controlling the price system. Third, minimum discount rates prevent both viators and purchasers from
making choices about the quality of their life. Thus, minimum discount rates are a restraint on the alienantion of property and
should be abrogated.
1.

Minimum Discount Rates Prevent Goods'From Going to Those
Who Value Them Most

Minimum discount rates violate the first underlying principle
of free alienation because they prevent a purchaser's capital investment from going to those who value them most, viators. Viators
place the greatest value on purchasers' capital, because they need
the cash to live. 92 Minimum discount rates prevent viators from
getting as much of a purchaser's capital as possible because any
minimum discount rate likely becomes the maximum price purchasers will offer for viatical insurance policies. 93 Minimum rates
become maximum rates because purchasers realize that they can
save money by offering to purchase insurance policies only at the
94
minimum rate.
The number of AIDS victims continues to rise astronomically,
90. See supra notes 72-89 and accompanying text discussing the three situations in which overriding policy considerations allow limited restraints on the
alienation of property.
91. See supra notes 68-81 and accompanying text discussion the three principles underlying the free alienation of property.
92. See supra note 13 for an explanation of the high cost of living with
AIDS.
93. Interview with David Petersen, President of Affording Care, New York,
NY (Sep. 9, 1993).
94. Id.; see also Interview with Parker Willson, supra note 17.
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as does the cost of living with this disease. 9 5 As a result, purchasers find themselves inundated with a host of viators needing to sell
their policies. 9 6 The influx of viators allows purchasers to save
money by buying a large number of policies at the same minimum
discount rate. Purchasers have no incentive to offer higher prices
because they can make large profits by simply buying more policies
without raising their offering price. 9 7 Consequently, viators are
unable to get larger settlement amounts for their policies, which
they need to combat their illness.
Moreover, by discouraging higher settlement offers, the operation of minimum rate regulations denies viators the benefits of the
competitive nature of the open market. 9 8 Of course, competitive
prices will develop if one company in a regulated state begins to
offer higher prices. However, since the number of needy AIDS victims virtually guarantees each company a steady and profitable clientele, it is unlikely that one company will upset the profitable
balance by increasing the prices it offers. As a result, viators face a
host of companies who engage in collusion by offering identical minimum prices while using the minimum discount regulations as an
excuse to do so.
Furthermore, minimum discount rates allow companies to complacently offer only the mandated minimum discount rate because
it allows them to minimize their overhead costs and risk factors.
Viatical settlement companies purchase life insurance policies in
order to make as large a profit on their investment as possible. 9 9
When a company buys a policy, it incurs certain costs, such as regular premium payments on the policies it has purchased10 0 and annual license fees.101
In addition, the ability to offer absolute minimum prices allows
purchasers to make a virtually guaranteed profit. The minimum
rates are often so low that a purchaser may avoid factoring in risk
95. See supra notes 1 and 13 for recent statistics on the reported number of

AIDS cases and the costs of living with the disease; see also Grossman, supra

note 1, at 44 (explaining the projected rapid increase in AIDS victims in the
very near future).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 19-41 for an explanation of how the
viatical settlement market provides financial assistance to save AIDS victims
from prospective poverty.
97. See MILTON & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 13-24 (1980) (explain-

ing the laws of competition, supply and demand, and market behavior).
98. See MILTON & FRIEDMAN, supra note 97, at 13-24 (explaining the response by one company to the competition of other companies).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27 for a discussion of the purpose

of viatical settlement companies.
100. Barrett, supra note 9, at 160.

101. CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.2 (West 1992); N.Y. INS. LAw § 7802 (McKinney
1993); MODEL VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS ACT § 3 (Proposed Official Draft 1993).
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factors and overhead costs. 10 2 Like the buying and selling of any

commodity, viatical settlements carry an element of risk. 10 3 These
include the risks that a cure for AIDS may be found 10 4 or that the
viators may live beyond their projected life expectancy, necessitating additional premium payments.' 0 5 However, minimum discount
rates virtually guaranty purchasers at least a 50% profit on their
investment. This gives viatical settlement purchasers an advantage over not only viators, but other participants in the open market. Moreover, purchasers have no incentive to offer competitive
settlement amounts to viators. Thus, statutory minimum discount
rates afford purchasers an unfair advantage in the open market.
Minimum discount rates should be eliminated to encourage
competitive pricing. Competitive pricing will allow viators to obtain
the best price for their policies. Under the current statutory
scheme, mandated minimum discount rates offer each company an
excuse and defense for offering the same minimum price. Removing statutory minimum discount rates will reduce purchasers' pro06
tections from collusive price fixing or impeding free competition.1
Additionally, dispensing with minimum discount rates will increase
competitive prices by reducing the companies' sense of complacency
07
and willingness to accept one minimum price for all policies.'
Thus, eliminating minimum discount rates will allow a viator to realize the maximum amount a purchaser is willing to pay for his life
insurance policy. As a result, a purchaser's capital investment will
go to someone who values it most, a viator.
The legislators' assertions that minimum discount rate provisions are necessary to protect the viators is misguided.' 0 Viators
will be adequately protected from under-pricing by the competitive
nature of the open market. The fact that despairing and frightened
viators are willing to take only what they think they can get for
their policies supports the argument that minimum discount rates
are unfair to viators. Moreover, eliminating minimum discount
rates sparks competitive prices among viatical companies and viators will become aware of the difference in prices through competi102. Id.; see also Interview with David Petersen, supra note 93 (explaining
the danger of minimum discount rates as a minimizing effect on purchaser
offers).

103. Interview with Parker Willson, supra note 17.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See supra note 39 (listing state statutes making monopolies and collusive price fixing illegal).
107. Interview with David Petersen, supra note 93; see also Interview with
Parker Willson, supra note 17 (arguing against minimum discount rates because they will lower the prices viators will receive for their policies).
108. See supra notes 31-38 for a discussion of the legislative history explaining the purpose for enacting viatical settlement legislation.
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tive advertising and word of mouth. 10 9 Companies offering the
minimum rates will get less business. Viators will then be able to
hold out for a higher price. Therefore, eliminating minimum discount rates will help viators get better prices for their policies.
2. Minimum Discount Rates Prevent the Natural Working of the
Market and Price System
Minimum discount rates violate the second underlying principle of free alienation in that they prevent free alienation from controlling the market system. Minimum rates are price controls.
Price controls violate the basic law of supply and demand. 11 0 According to this basic economic principle, if more viatical companies
want to purchase policies than people with AIDS want to sell them,
the prices offered will increase. 1
Conversely, if more people with
AIDS want to sell their policies than viatical companies want to
buy, the prices paid for the policies will decrease.' 12 With the increasing numbers of needy AIDS victims, it correlates that the sup13
ply of viators will exceed the number of buyers."
Although the great profit potential in viatical settlements has
caused a considerable increase in the number of viatical companies
since 1988, it is unlikely that the demand viatical companies will
ever rise above the supply of viatical insurance policies. 11 4 Some
states with viatical regulatory statutes have seen less growth in vil 5
atical settlement companies than states without regulation."
109. See supra note 29 (discussing the advertising which viatical settlement
companies do). In addition, many organizations exist to provide financial counseling for people with AIDS. Interview with David Petersen, supra note 93.
One agency is Affording Care, which publishes a newsletter and provides representatives who will caution viators to beware of unfair viatical companies. Id.
110. John W. Merline, What You Need to Know About Price Controls, CONSUMERS' RES. MAG., Mar. 1993, at 16; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 93, at 13-24
(explaining how the price system functions and how market prices are important in transmitting information about commodities).
111. See Merline, supra note 106, at 16-17 (explaining the basic principles of
supply and demand); see also MILTON & FRIEDMAN, supra note 97, at 13-24 (explaining the laws of supply and demand and the importance uncontrolled pricing for a commodity to ensure the correct transmission of information about
that commodity.
112. Merline, supra note 110, at 16-17.
113. See Grossman, supra note 1, at 44 (stating that "[bly the year 2000, it is
also estimated that at least 40 million worldwide will be carrying HIV.. ").
"'At the present time,' says William Haseltine, chief of the human retrovirology
division at the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute in Boston, 'there is nothing standing in the way of this happening.'" Id.
114. Id.
115. See Interview with David Petersen, supra note 93 (explaining that the
Kansas licensing statute is so confusing that no viatical companies have
developed).
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116
it
Since viatical settlement regulation is itself rapidly increasing,
is unlikely that the number of viatical purchasers will increase as
quickly as the number of viators. Also, at least one state has explicitly forbidden the sale of life insurance policies for cash. 1 17 This
presents the possibility that other states will do the same, thereby
further decreasing the number of viatical purchasers.
Minimum discount rates also create potential problems for viators willing to sell below the statutory cap. The market may eventually reach an equilibrium. At that point, purchasers may not be
willing to pay the statutory cap. More importantly, viators are precluded from accepting a price lower than the statutory minimum.
Thus, the market will break down because viators will be unable to
adjust their prices below the minimum rate to coincide with the demands of purchasers."l 8 Consequently, the statutory scheme will
deprive viators of their abilility to alienate their personal assets by
preventing them from selling their life insurance policies at a price
purchasers are willing to pay on the open market. 119 Therefore, the
second principle underlying the preference toward free alienation is
thwarted because statutory minimum rates will not allow free
alienation to control the market system.

3.

Minimum Discount Rates Prevent Individuals from Making
Choices About Their Life Quality

Minimum discount rates violate the third underlying principle
for free alienation of property by preventing viators from making
their own life quality choices. As discussed above, minimum rates
prevent viators from choosing the price to accept for their insurance
policies. 120 Many individuals who sell their insurance policies have
already used up all other available cash in living with their illness. 1 2 ' A viatical settlement may be their only means of obtaining
cash. Thus, AIDS victims not only need the maximum amount of
money they can realize from the sale of their policies, but also in a
declining market they may be willing to settle for an amount below
the statutory cap out of desperation.
Individuals entering into viatical settlements have generally
been living with their illness for several years. Although these indi116. See Interview with Carolyn Johnson, supra note 36 (explaining that the

goal of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners is to prompt all
states to develop viatical settlement regulation).
117. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31A-21-104 (1993).
118. See Merline, supra note 110, at 16-17 (explaining that when demand is
low, the supply will rise); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 97, at 13-24 (explaining
the importance of allowing the laws of supply and demand to function freely).
119. See Merline, supra note 110, at 16 (stating that fixing an artificially
high price discourages buyers from purchasing).
120. Interview with David Petersen, supra note 93.
121. See supra note 17 for a discussion about living with AIDS.
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viduals usually have only one or two years left to live, advances in
medicine often prolong the inevitable. 122 Moreover, a growing
number of people with AIDS want to make viatical settlements
before they reach the last two years of their lives. 123 AIDS victims
may want to use the money from a viatical settlement to purchase a
1 24
home or take a trip while they are still well enough to enjoy it.
Minimum discount rates stifle individuals' life quality choices.
As discussed above, minimum discount rates limit an individual's
ability to realize the highest price available for their life insurance
policy. Conversely, minimum discount rates preclude an individual
from settling for a price below the statutory minimum. Because an
AIDS victim's life insurance policy is one of his most liquid assets, it
is often his only avenue to enjoying his final years. Thus, the choice
an AIDS victim has as to the quality of his life is severly deterred.
Moreover, individuals with a life expectancy of greater than
two years are ironically at a grave disadvantage. 125 Since purchasers must pay a minimum rate for viatical settlements, they prefer
viators with a shorter life expectancy. 126 Consequently, purchasers
are encouraged to buy numerous policies which give them a two
year return on their investments. They are unwilling to pay the
27
same price for policies which give them a five or six year return.1
Finally, minimum discount rates prevent price scaling for policies with a longer investment return. Although the differences in
investment periods is often minimal, minimum rates discourage
purchasers from buying policies from individuals with longer life
expectancy. 128 Common business sense prefers a higher return
over a shorter investment period. Thus, the elimination of minimum rates would allow purchasers to pay a lower price for policies
12 9
with a longer investment period.
B.

Licensing for Requirements for Individual PurchasersViolates
the Rule Requiring Free Alienation

Like minimum discount rate provisions, the requirement that
individual purchasers be licensed to purchase a viator's insurance
policy frustrates the principles of free alienation. First, strict licensing requirements prevent goods from going to those who most
value them. Second, these requirements artificially control the
122. Enrico, supra note 3, at 53.
123. Interview with David Petersen, supra note 93.
124. Id.

125. Id.

126. Id.
127. Interview with Parker Willson, supra note 17.
128. Interview with David Petersen, supra note 93; see also Merline, supra
note 110, at 16-17 (explaining the incentive to maximize profit as much as possible by purchasing the most valuable property).
129. Grossman, supra note 1, at 44.
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market system by excluding willing purchasers. Third, licensing
requirements prevent both viators and purchasers from making
choices about their quality of life. Thus, subjecting individual purchasers to the same requirements as viatical settlement companies
is a restraint on the alienantion of property and should be
abrogated.
1.

Licensing Requirements for Individual PurchasersPrevent
Goods from Going to Those Who Value Them Most

The requirement that individual purchasers be licensed
removes a significant portion of purchasers from the market. 130 By
excluding potential purchasers from the market, these requirements violate the principle which allows goods to go to those who
value them most. Stated another way, the exclusion of prospective
purchasers reduces the possibility of competive pricing and, thus,
prevents a purchaser's investment capital from going to those who
value it most, viz. viators.
Viators need to sell their life insurance policies so that they can
live with the cost of their illness. The more money a viator can get
for his life insurance policy, the more comfortable and worry-free he
can make the last years of his life. In addition, many viators state
that the large sums of money they receive for their life insurance
policies set their minds at ease to such an extent that the money
increases their will to live and overcome their illness. 13 1 Accordingly, it is essential that viators realize the highest return possible
for their life insurance polices.
2. Licensing Requirements for Individual PurchasersPrevent the
Natural Working of the Market and Price System
Licensing requirements for individual purchasers frustrate free
alienation because they artificially control the market system by excluding willing purchasers. Whereas viatical settlement companies
have the resources and assets to comply with the statutory provisions and licensing procedures, individual purchasers are unwilling
and often unable to pay the large application fees in addition to the
132
regular premium payments on a viator's former policy.
Individual purchasers are also unwilling to participate in full
financial disclosure, potential investigations by the insurance commissioner, and constant oversight of their contracts and transac130. Interview with Parker Willson, supra note 17.
131. Groves, supra note 28, at Z9.
132. Id. See also Letter from Parker Willson, President, The Gay and Lesbian Alliance of Central Texas, to Mark Hannay, Representative of Gay Men's
Health Crisis (July 25, 1993) [on file with The John Marshall Law Review]
(stating that "[should buyers be included in this [viatical settlement] bill ...
their [sic] will be few buyers of policies, as has happened in California . . ").
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tions.13 3
Additionally, individual purchasers lack sufficient
knowledge to educate viators as to their options and the ramifications of the viatical settlements.1 3 4 Ultimately, the complicated
and extensive licensing procedures deter individual purchasers
from buying policies. 135

Since the licensing requirements deter individual purchasers
from purchasing the viators' insurance policies, the number of potential purchasers is significantly reduced. 136 Viators have a
smaller pool of purchasers from which to choose when selling their
policies. 13 7 The smaller number of purchasers reduces the competithe prices offered for the
tion for viators' policies and ensures that
138
policies level off at the minimum rate.
Viatical settlements are necessarily more advantageous for viators when viatical companies know they are competing with other
companies or potential purchasers-i.e., prices go up. 1 39

Conse-

quently, if viatical settlement companies know that individual purchasers in the market will provide competitive offers for the viators,
the companies will be more likely to increase their prices. However,
requiring individual purchasers to be licensed impedes the action of
the market system by arbitrarily excluding potential purchasers
and competitors. Consequently, demand is reduced and there is no
reason for competitive pricing.

133. See Letter from Parker Willson to Mark Hannay, supra note 132 (stating that "[a]s the [New York] Bill now reads, a buyer will have to be licensed in
the State of New York, with full disclosure, in order to provide the money to
those seeking help through the selling of a private asset"); see also supra notes
31-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of these statutory provisions.
134. Letter from Parker Willson to Mark Hannay, supra note 132.
135. Letter from Parker Willson to Mark Hannay, supra note 132. See also
Interview with Parker Willson, supra note 17 (explaining that requiring indi-

vidual buyers to comply with the complicated licensing procedures will deter
them from offering to buy the insurance policies).
136. Interview with Parker Willson, supra note 17. See also Letter from
Parker Willson to Mark Hannay, supra note 132 (explaining the deterrent effect the individual licensing requirements will have on potential individual
purchasers).
137. Interview with Parker Willson, supra note 17. See also Letter from

Parker Willson to Mark Hannay, supra note 132 (explaining the reduction in

buyers that will result from the statutory licensing provisions).

138. The number of people demanding the insurance policies will be reduced,
because the buyers will be deterred from entering the market. See Merline,
supra note 110, at 16 (stating that generally, when supplies are high, prices

fall); cf FRIEDMAN, supra note 97, at 16-17 (explaining the fact that the price of
a commodity rises when there is a greater number of buyers, or greater
demand).
139. Interview with David Petersen, supra note 93.
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3. Licensing Requirements for Individual PurchasersPrevent
Viators From Making Choices About the Quality of
their lives
Licensing requirements for individual purchasers violate the
principles of free alienation by preventing viators from making
their own choices about the quality of their lives. When a viator
decides to sell his life insurance policy, he makes the choice to improve the quality of his life by procuring needed funds to combat the
expenses of his illness. 140 However, requiring individual purchasers to comply with the same licensing requirements as viatical companies reduces a viators choices.
As discussed above, the statutory requirements for obtaining a
license deter individual purchasers from applying for licenses and,
thus, deter potential purchasers from entering the market.' 4 1 The
removal of purchasers from the market consequently reduces competitive pricing of life insurance policies. 14 2 Thus, a viator is again
unable to realize the maximum return for his policy. Consequently,
a viator's choice as to his quality of life has been made by the state
legislature.
In addition, a viator's choice as to whom to sell his policy is
reduced because the pool of purchasers is reduced. The decision to
sell one's life insurance policy is a very important one. Many viators may feel more comfortable dealing with an individual purchaser rather than a large, sophisticated company. 14 3 Viators may
want to decide for themselves whether they want to deal with the
person to whom they have chosen to sell their policies. 144 Individual licensing potentially eliminates this option because viators will
be unable to find individual purchasers willing to purchase their
policies. 14 5 Thus, viators will be unable to make choices about their
own life quality because their choices will be so limited.
Although licensing requirements for individual purchasers do
not prevent viators from entering a viatical settlement, the requirements limit their choices and their ability to improve the quality of
their lives. Because purchasers are forced to go through the extensive licensing procedures, their ability to make money is hindered.
The option to invest in a viatical insurance policy is less of an option
140. See supra notes 13-29 and accompanying text explaining how viatical
settlements help terminally ill individuals to get the money they need to improve the quality of their lives.
141. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of how
requiring individual purchasers to be licensed will remove a significant number
of purchasers from the market.
142. See supra notes 106-110 and accompanying text for an explanation of
the consequences of removing individual purchasers from the market.

143. Interview with Parker Willson, supra note 17.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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and more of a burden because the procedures for doing so are so
extensive and difficult. As a result, viators are unable to choose to
improve their life quality by selling their policies to individual purchasers rather than viatical companies. Therefore, although viators may still choose to participate in viatical settlements, licensing
requirements for individual purchasers prevent free alienation by
limiting the life quality choices viators can make.
V.

CONCERNS WHICH PROMPT RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION

Do

NOT APPLY TO THE STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON
VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS

As discussed in the previous section, statutory restrictions on
viatical settlements limit a viator's ability to sell his policy for the
highest price possible. In some instances, the restrictions hinder a
viator's ability to sell their policies at all. The protective concerns
which prompt these restraining provisions do not outweigh the potential for harm to viators.
Although the goals of viatical settlement statutes are valid in
their aim to protect the viators, the restrictive provisions are not
necessary to achieve this goal. The broad protections of the other
statutory provisions and alternative safeguards will sufficiently
protect a viator's interests.
A.

The Statutory Restrictions are Not Necessary to Prevent
Externalities of Viatical Settlements

Since viatical settlements do not create significant externalities, the statutory restrictions are unnecessary to prevent external
costs. The sale of life insurance policies does not create economic
inefficiency by reducing the value of another's entitlement because
the exchange does not have a continuous impact on the possessions
of others.146 Unlike the sale of a pollution-producing factory, which
creates externalities by reducing the surrounding property values,
a viatical transaction merely entails the transfer of one's insurance
policy, a harmless possession, to another. This is similar to the sale
146. See Letter from Parker Willson to Mark Hannay, supra note 132, comparing the sale of life insurance policies to real estate transactions, and emphasizing the simplicity of the transaction. But see Letter from Mark Scherzer,
Representative of Gay Men's Health Crisis, New York, to Mario Cuomo, Governor of New York (July 27, 1993) [on file with The John Marshall Law Review]
stating:
[Tihe purchase of life insurance policies is not like the sale of tangible property in which all relationship ceases after the sale is made. The viatical
settlement company develops an immediate financial interest in the
prompt death of the insured person. It may remain in close touch with the
viator to ascertain the moment of his or her death.
Id.
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of a car. 147 As in the sale of a car, the sellers' possession and the
buyers' possession will merely change hands because each individual has decided he has a better use for the other's possession.
When this happens, each individual will use his new possession to
his highest advantage, and will not detract from the possessions or
entitlements of others.
In addition, viatical settlement transactions do not create economic inefficiencies by making it difficult for the courts to objectively determine the property's value. Since the sellers and the
buyers are entering into a mutual agreement for the transfer of
property, they independently determine the property's value, and
the courts need not interfere. 148 The insurance policies are not intangible or unusual possessions, such as education degrees or other
human capital. 14 9 Rather, they are concrete pieces of property
which have an objective market value, i.e., the face value of the policy. Moreover, if a viator does claim overreaching by a purchaser,
courts will have a definite reference point in determining the correct value. Courts will be able to look at the going rate for similar
policies. Therefore, since it is possible for individuals and courts to
objectively determine the value of these policies, these transactions
will not create judicial economic inefficiencies.
Finally, if legislators eliminate minimum discount rates allowing maximum returns, these private contracts will not create
unfavorable economic consequences such as monopolies and collusive price fixing. Rather, the law of supply and demand will protect
viators from such occurrences.'r 0 The number of viatical settlement companies in this country is steadily increasing, as is the
number of individual purchasers. 51 ' If legislators eliminate restrictive provisions which thwart competition, purchasers will compete
with each other.' 5 2 No matter how many viators there are, individual purchasers and viatical companies will work to attract the
greatest number of viators by providing the best price for the poli147. See Interview with David Petersen, supra note, comparing the sale of a

life insurance policy to the sale of a used car.
148. See supra notes 13-29 and accompanying text for an explanation of how

the viatical settlement process works.
149. See Sterk, supra note 61, at 383 (defining human capital to include only
those items which are inseparable from the individual, not the personal property of the individual).
150. See

MILTON

& FRIEDMAN, supra note 97, at 13-24 (explaining how the

laws of supply and demand work to the advantage and protection of buyers and
sellers).
151. In just five years, the number of viatical settlement companies has increased from one to fifty.

AFFORDING CARE, VIATICAL SETTLEMENT COMPANIES,

supra note 18.
152, Merline, supra note 110, at 16; see also MILTON & FRIEDMAN, supra note
97, at 113-21 (explaining the laws of competition).
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Thus, competitive pricing will result and viators will be

able to shop around for higher offers.
Alternatively, if the AIDS epidemic subsides and the number of
viators decreases, insurance policies will be scarce and prices will
increase.154 Consequently, without minimum discount rates, companies will be unable to monopolize the industry or fix prices because there will be too many purchasers competing for the policies.
Moreover, the purchasers will not have the excuse of minimum discount rates to explain any price fixing tendencies. 155 Therefore,
since viatical settlement transactions do not create economic inefficiencies, the statutory provisions are not necessary to alleviate
these externalities.
In addition, the statutory restrictions are unnecessary to prevent external costs in the form of moralisms because the value of
the viatical settlement industry outweighs the offense some people
feel about the sale of death benefits. 15 6 The sale of life insurance
policies provides viators with the money they need to live. 157 The
sale of these policies will enable individuals to increase their financial freedom because the sales will help dying viators pay their
creditors' 58 and make their last days more secure.' 5 9 Purchasers
will benefit from the policy payouts, and the payouts will also allow
an infusion of money into the economy. 160 Therefore, others' desire
153. Merline, supra note 110, at 16; see also MILTON & FRIEDMAN, supra note
97, at 113-21 (explaining the laws of supply and demand and how price levels
respond to increased demand for a commodity).
154. Merline, supra note 110, at 16-17; see also MILTON & FRIEDMAN, supra
note 97, at 113-21 (arguing against price controls because they hamper the flow
of information regarding the supply and demand of products).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 138-140 for the prospect of companies using minimum discount rates as legal excuses to offer maximum prices.
156. "This form of marketing is ghoulish, insensitive, possibly violative of
confidentiality rights and flat-out illegal.. .. " Scams Cash in By Selling Policies of the Dying, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1992, at 2.
157. Interview with Parker Willson, supra note 17; see also Interview with
David Petersen, supra note 93 (explaining the importance of the viatical settlement industry to dying individuals who desperately need money).
158. The New York statute contains a provision which explicitly forbids any
health care facility or practitioner to condition admission, treatment, or continuing care on the viatication of a life insurance policy. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 20 (McKinney 1993). Neither the California nor NAIC statutes address the
issue of payment of medical bills. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10113.1-10113.2 (West

1992);

MODEL VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS ACT §§

1-12 (National Association of In-

surance Commissioners, Proposed Official Draft 1993). Consequently, it remains unclear whether creditors such as hospitals have any claim to the
proceeds received from a viatical settlement.
159. See supra notes 13-30 and accompanying text for an explanation of the
viatical settlement industry and the uses to which the AIDS victims put the
money.

160. See supra notes 13-30 and accompanying text discussing the fact that
the purchasers pay the viators money, which the viators then use to pay bills
and purchase necessary items.
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to prevent alienation of this property, do not apply to viatical settlement transactions and do not mandate statutory restrictions.
B.

Self Paternalismand True PaternalismDo Not Require the
Statutory Restrictions

Since other statutory provisions protect the viators from harmful momentary temptations from acting with insufficient information and from acting with insufficient mental capacity,16 1 licensing
requirements for individual purchasers are unnecessary to protect
viators from these situations. The statutes' paternal goals are
valid. However, the restrictive provisions which this Note discusses
are not necessary to achieve these goals. The statutes as a whole
are designed to protect viators from sophisticated companies and
brokers who may take advantage of them and fail to inform them of
162
the agreement's potential consequences.
The laws require viatical companies and brokers to inform viators about the financial consequences of a viatical settlement, such
161. The California statute uses the term "sound mind" when discussing the
level of mental capacity a viator must indicate when seeking to viaticate his life
insurance policy. CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.1(c)(1) (West 1992). The Model Viati-

cal Settlements statute also uses this term.

MODEL VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS ACT

§ 9(A)(1) (National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Proposed Official
Draft 1993). The New York statute merely requires that the viator "represents
that he or she has a full and complete understanding of the viatical settlement."
N.Y. INS. LAW § 7808(a) (McKinney 1993). However, the statutes fail to define
the terms they use when describing the viators' mental capacity. See CAL. INS.
CODE § 10113.1(c)(1) (West 1992); N.Y. INS. CODE § 7808(a) (McKinney 1993);
MODEL VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS ACT § 9(A)(1) (National Association of Insurance

Commissioners, Proposed Official Draft 1993). The Restatement (Second) of
Property requires an individual to have sufficient mental competency in order
to validly give away his individual property as a gift. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF PROPERTY § 34.5 (1991). The Restatement defines mental competency as the
ability to completely understand the importance of a donative transfer (the giving of a gift) with regard to the individual's own situation. Id. at cmt. a.
"Stated another way, to be mentally competent a person must know and understand the extent of his or her property, comprehend to whom he or she is giving
his or her property, and know the natural objects of his or her bounty." Id.
This definition can be used when attempting to determine whether a potential viator retains the mental capacity to understand the viatical settlement
and its ramifications. The companies should use as a standard for sufficient
mental capacity the determination whether the viator knows the extent of his
insurance policy, comprehends to whom he intends to sell the policy and the
price which he stands to receive for it, and knows the benefits he stands to lose
from the sale of the policy.
However, the viatical companies and insurance commissioners alike should
be cautious in ruling a viator mentally incompetent just because he suffers from
a terminal illness. Interview with David Petersen, supra note 93. "These people are sick, but they are not stupid. They can understand how much money
they are getting for their policies." Id.
162. CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.2 (West 1992), N.Y. INS. LAw § 7807 (McKinney
1993); MODEL VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS ACT § 8 (Proposed Official Draft 1993).
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as potential loss of medicaid benefits 163 and the possible taxability
of viatical settlement income. 164 Additionally, the statutes require
that brokers and companies receive a statement from a medical professional confirming that the viator retains the mental capacity to
understand the transaction and its ramifications. 16 5 Viators themselves must also sign a statement attesting to their illnesses, to
their understanding of the transaction, and to the voluntariness of
the settlement. 166 Finally, since the brokers and companies must
be licensed, the insurance commissioner can oversee and regulate
the transactions to prevent coercion and undue influence of the
67

viators. 1

The additional provision requiring licensing of individuals does
nothing to further protect viators from unwise decisions or inadequate information because most individual purchasers will use a
broker as an intermediary. 168 Consequently, viatical brokers will
meet the statutory requirements, making it unnecessary for individual purchasers to do so. 169 Although viators who choose not to
163. CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.2; N.Y. INS. LAW § 7807; MODEL VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS

AcT § 8.

TLEMENTS

AcT § 8.

164. CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.2; N.Y. INS. LAw § 7807; MODEL VIATICAL SET-

165. CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.1; N.Y. INS. LAw § 7808; MODEL VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS ACT § 9.
166. CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.1; N.Y. INS. LAW § 7808; MODEL VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS AT § 9.
167. CAL. INS. CODE § 10113.2; N.Y. INS. LAw §§ 7801-7810; MODEL VIATICAL
SETTLEMENTS AcT §§ 1-12.
168. See Letter from Parker Willson to Mark Hannay, supra note 132.
169. See id. stating:
In summarizing our concerns, let us move away from the concept of a terminally ill brother or sister which tends to color our logic with emotion, and
look at the sale of a private asset we all take for granted, the selling of a
home. In selling a home there is a seller, a broker, and eventually a buyer.
The seller goes to the broker and lists his home on the market as being for
sale. The broker then makes every effort to find a buyer for the seller and
get the highest offer possible for the house based on the market, age of
house, condition of the house, etc. When the broker finds a buyer, the broker brings together the seller and the buyer by offering to the seller a contract of sale, based on what the buyer is willing to pay, and negotiations
begin. Eventually a price is agreed upon, or the seller says no and instructs
the broker to continue to look. In the end, a satisfactory agreement is
reached between the seller and the buyer through the broker and a deal is
made. The buyer issues a check and when the check clears, the buyer has a
house and the seller has his or her money. It is a simple process, and does
have within it regulations which protect the seller from any adverse activity by the broker, and protects the buyer by calling for complete disclosure
by the seller so the buyer may make an educated offer to the seller. This is
a process that has been happening daily in this country for many years. If
we were to put the constraints on this "home buying" scenario that are
listed in Bill A.7817, we would then find the buyer of a home having to be
licensed to buy a home in the State in which the home is being sold, being
responsible to the seller for legal and financial advice, having to give full
disclosure before being able to buy the home, and before the sale can be
finalized, waiting to find out if a Real Estate Commissioner or Superinten-
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go through a viatical broker, have greater potential for falling victim to undue influence and unfair practices by individual purchasers, there are other adequate safeguards to protect viators.
Most individuals who make viatical settlements still expect to
live at least one or two years and are still competent to handle their
affairs.' 70 It is unlikely that an individual purchaser will be able to
take advantage of a helpless and weak viator on his deathbed by
convincing the viator to sell his policy for an outrageously low price.
17
Although viators are ill, they are not mentally incapacitated. ' If
viators do not like the offer made by an individual purchaser, they
always have the option to sell their policy to a company, or to work
through a viatical broker. Additionally, if a viator wants financial
counseling about the ramifications of a settlement, there are numerous financial advice agencies and other counseling groups
which exist for just that purpose.' 7 2 Also, the law provides remedies for viators who make unfair settlements with overreaching
purchasers by allowing viators to appeal to the courts to invalidate
illegal or unfair contracts.' 7 3 Finally, most insurance companies
require a showing of mental capacity on the part of the policyholder
before allowing him to change the beneficiary of his life insurance
policy.

74

Although a viator's competency to handle his affairs does not
necessarily mean that individual purchasers will not attempt to
take advantage of him, most viator's are well aware of their vulnerability. Viators recognize that living with the knowledge of impending death and emotional impact of their disease will make them
susceptible to manipulation and overreaching by individual buyers.
However, most individuals who sell their life insurance policies
dent will OK the sale at the price offered, or will raise the sale price, at
which time the buyer will probably back out and the seller will be left with
nothing. If the constraints were placed on the Real Estate industry, there
would be very few for sale signs in the front yards of America, as there
would be very few buyers.
Id.
170. Enrico, supra note 3, at 53.
171. See Interview with David Petersen, supra note 93 (stating that "[these
people are sick. They are not stupid. They can figure out when someone is
trying to take advantage of them.")
172. Affording Care is just one of the protective groups which have developed
to help people with AIDS deal financially with their disease. Id. Such groups
offer counseling and advice on how best to budget limited funds. Id. In addition, the groups educate people with AIDS and other terminally ill individuals
on the potential overreaching and unfair practices of some viatical companies.
Id.
173. See supra notes 82-83 and sources cited for a discussion of the remedies
courts will provide when the contract terms are unfair.
174. See supra note 22 and sources cited for a discussion of the feasibility
and process of viators changing their life insurance beneficiaries).
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have been living with their illness for several years. 175 They have
become accustomed to the knowledge that their life expectancy is
limited, and have, to some extent, come to terms with that knowledge. When they make the choice to viaticate their insurance policies, they have determined to live with their illness in the best way
possible, for as long as possible. This fact, combined with counseling and support groups educate viators to beware of overreaching
buyers, 176 will prevent viators from letting their grief make them
the victims of unfair purchasers. Therefore, allowing individual
buyers to enter the market more easily by foregoing the extensive
licensing requirements for them will not defeat the paternal interest in protecting the viators.
VI.

PROPOSAL

Although minimum discount rates and licensing requirements
for individual purchasers are intended to protect viators, they actually harm these individuals by making it more difficult or even impossible for viators to sell their life insurance policies. 17 7 At the
same time, these well-meaning provisions are not necessary to
achieve the intended protective goals. The supposed dangers are
17 8
either non-existent, minimal, or alleviated by other safeguards.
In order to combat the problems caused by minimum discount
rates, legislators should simply remove the minimum rates provisions from viatical settlement statutes and allow free competition to
regulate the prices viators receive for their policies. This will spark
competitive prices among viatical purchasers by eliminating the in179
centive to complacently offer only the minimum discount rates.
It will also allow all viators to accept any price they choose for their
policies, whether it is high or low. i 8 0 In this way, needy viators
with special circumstances, such as longer life expectancies, will
not be excluded from the market. Even without minimum discount
rates, viators will not fall victim to companies who refuse to offer
fair prices because the increasing number of purchasers will make
175. Enrico, supra note 3, at 53; see also interview with David Petersen,

supra note 89 (discussing the fact that people who sell their life insurance policies usually have come to terms with their situation).
176. See supra notes 25, 105 and accompanying text for a discussion of advertising by viatical companies and the function of financial advice agencies for
people with AIDS.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 86-141 for an explanation of the
harm the statutory provisions will cause viators.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 136-172 for a discussion of the fact
that the statutory provisions are not necessary to protect the viators.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 102-105 for a discussion of the free
competition that will result if the minimum discount rate provisions are
removed.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 102-105 for a discussion of the advantages of letting viators choose their own prices for their policies.
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it disadvantageous for any one company to offer less than competitive prices.' 8 ' In addition, the numerous protective special interest
groups and counseling agencies will act quickly to warn viators to
stay away from any particular company who offers unfair prices.
Therefore, this Note proposes to alleviate the problems which minimum discount rates cause by simply removing this provision from
the viatical settlement statutes, and allowing unrestricted pricing
for the viatical settlement policies.
Similarly, legislators should also remove the term "individual"
from the list of entities which must be licensed to transact viatical
settlements. The new statutes should subject viatical companies to
the current licensing requirements, companies being defined as
those entities which exist solely for the purpose of making viatical
transactions and viatical brokers. However, the new statutes
should only govern individual purchasers by less extensive
provisions.
The main problem with licensing for individual purchasers
arises because the extensive and complicated nature of the statutes
excludes individual purchasers from the market, especially if these
purchasers only wish to make a limited number of viatical settlements.' 8 2 Since increased numbers of purchasers in the market
will help viators to get the best prices for their policies, the new
83
statutes should not exclude individual purchasers.'
However, since it is arguably possible that individual purchasers may also try to take advantage of viators, they should not be
completely unregulated. Rather, legislators should establish a special agency which will oversee transactions by individual purchasers. Pursuant to this agency's rules, individual purchasers will
report the terms and content of each proposed viatical settlement
transaction. In addition, purchasers should be required to submit a
signed statement from the viator, a medical professional attesting
to the viator's mental capacity and the viator's agreement to the
terms of the settlement. The agency should act quickly to review
the terms of the contract, and either approve or disapprove the
transaction. In determining the fairness of the contracts' terms, the
agency should use the same standard applied in reviewing settlements with viatical companies.
In this way, individual purchasers will not go completely unregulated because a system will be in place to discourage and prevent overreaching and unfairness. At the same time, however,
181. See supra text accompanying notes 102-105 for a discussion of the free

competition that will result from removing minimum discount rate provisions.
182. See supra notes 125-141 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
harmful effects of deterring individual buyers from entering the market.
183. See supra notes 125-141 and accompanying text for a discussion of the

importance of keeping individual buyers in the viatical market.
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purchasers will not be deterred from making single transactions because they will not be subject to complicated, extensive, and cumbersome licensing procedures and oversight. Therefore, individual
purchasers should not be included in the statutory licensing provisions, but should instead be subject to a more convenient, less extensive oversight procedure.
CONCLUSION

Viatical settlement statutes are intended to protect viators by
making sure purchasers do not take advantage of them. However,
statutory minimum rates and strict licensing requirements for individual purchasers harm viators by making it more difficult for them
to get high prices for their policies. In the extreme, the statutory
restrictions have the potential to prevent viators from selling their
policies at all.
Thus, because the statutory restrictions are not necessary to
protect viators from overreaching purchasers, legislators should abrogate minimum discount rate provisions. In addition, legislators
should not require licensing for individual purchasers and should
mandate less extensive oversight for these purchasers. These
changes will allow the viatical settlement market to benefit all parties involved to its fullest ability.
Jennifer Berner

